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Experimental protocols used to interface specific theo-
retical questions to empirical evidence needs to be contex-
tualized within a univocal linguistic framework. It is well 
known that theoretical concepts must be operationalized, 
that is, each concept must be defined by the measuring 
operations used. Within psychology studies, for example, 
the concept of hunger can be operationally defined as the 
number of hours of deprivation of food or as under-feed-
ing. In this case, the terms “deprivation”, “food”, “under-
feeding” have anunivocal linguistic meaning, but this is not 
always the case.
One who deals with visual perception has often to deal 
also with terminological problems. In fact, it often happens 
that lexicon does not include an appropriate term to name a 
certain perceptual phenomenon, even if it is simple, in terms 
of the number of spatial and temporal gradients. Quite the 
opposite, just the simplest situations, less articulated, are the 
ones that raise the terminological problems most difficult 
to solve. It is enough to think at Ganzfeld1,that undeniably 
is the simplest stimulation condition in the visual domain, 
where the term used to describe the associated phenomenal 
experience is “fog”. For example, a researcher intending to 
measure the perceived density of this fog as a function of the 
illumination will have to face the age-old problem of which 
instructions give to observers and, even before, the problem 
to operationally define “fog”: “Please, compare this fog to 
this scale of fogs and tell me which one is the more simi-
lar”. Then, it is possible to find that “subjects” in perception 
labs are able to perform whatever task is assigned to them, 
including a task of judging the size of an apple on a scale 
of pears, because, after all, each pair of objects has some 
common feature. 
In this short account, we will talk about a study we have 
done to investigate grey surfaces perception under “ecologi-
cal” conditions. With this aim, we identified some buildings 
having grey walls with reflective properties similar to those 
of a Munsell scale (Numerical scale of chroma devised by 
A.H. Munsell and exhibited in the Munsell Book of Col-
our), in such a way to be able to afford their reflectance 
values. We examined both interiors and exteriors surfaces. 
The most difficult part of the research was the experimental 
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Terminology is a crucial problem in science, since quite often the terms used to denote theoretical concepts are 
directly taken from the vocabulary of common words, which usually have multiple meanings. To solve this problem, 
scientists must operationalize the theoretical concepts they use but, in psychology, sometimes, this can be a difficult 
task, since the meaning of the terms used to give the instructions to observers can interfere with the spontaneous 
meaning that observers give to those terms. Starting from some empirical observations, we show that colour appear-
ance is affected not only by the perceptual but also by the linguistic context.
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1 An entirely homogeneous field, that is realized in such a way that the 
same quantity of light comes to the eye from each direction.
14
AGOSTINI and GALMONTE, Colour appearance and linguistic contex, Review of Psychology, 2010, Vol. 17, No 1, 13-16
one, considerably varied as a function of the time and of the 
meteorological conditions. To compensate for this problem, 
we decided to collect the maximum possible observations 
in a short lapse of time. Therefore, for some days we went 
out always at the same time shouldering the photometer, we 
placed it always at the same distance from the surface on 
examination, and we measured its luminance. Straight af-
terwards we stopped people passing, mainly students, since 
the places we chose where inside Rutgers campus, and af-
ter placing them exactly at the same position where before 
the photometer was, we asked them to choose on a Munsell 
scale the grey that was more similar to the grey of the wall 
in front of them. In a Psychophysics experiment, when you 
want to measure a surface colour and not other different 
aspects like brilliance, compactness, etc., the experimental 
protocol provides that the instructions are given in the fol-
lowing way: “In front of you there is a surface. What you 
are asked to do is to choose on this scale the grey that, in 
your opinion, has been cut from the same material as the 
surface”. In the latter case, the stress is put on colour and 
not on illumination. In certain cases, the same task can be 
formulated in a different way, by using, for example, a more 
common term, that is that of brightness: “Choose which one 
between those two surfaces is brighter” or “choose on this 
scale the grey that equate in terms of brightness the grey of 
that surface”. The term brightness, however, in the common 
language, can denote both the surface colour and the per-
ceived intensity of the light reflected by objects. In fact, it 
is possible to say both that an object colour is brighter than 
another object, and that a lighted area of the same object is 
brighter with respect to a shadowed area.
Two perceptual meanings, then, one tied to the reflec-
tive properties of the surfaces, and the other to the inten-
sive properties of illumination. Another term introduced by 
Koffka (1935) to denote surface colour is whiteness. With 
this term Koffka referred to the quantity of white perceived 
in a certain blend of grey, therefore putting the stress on 
colour and not on illumination.
In a preliminary experiment we asked some observers to 
perform a task about colour perception, by using the three 
above-mentioned definitions. In the first case they had to 
choose from the scale the grey that was cut from the same 
cardboard as the target, in the second case they had to choose 
the one having the same brightness, and in the last case they 
had to choose the one having the same lightness. Independ-
ently from the kind of instructions, observers reported basi-
cally the same data. Therefore, as already said, despite the 
preliminary experiment did not show differences among the 
instructions, we decided to use the protocol that more ex-
plicitly refers to a matching on a colour level and not on that 
of the perceived intensity of the reflected light. Observers 
had to choose the grey on a Munsell scale and we wrote the 
corresponding number on a piece of paper.
However, there were some situations in which system-
atically a curious fact happened. Some of the walls that we 
had chosen for the experiment were, at the time of the day 
where we collected the data, partly in the shadow and partly 
directly exposed to the sunlight. In those cases, the observer 
was invited to choose from the scale a grey value both for 
the colour of the shadowed part and for the lighted part. The 
instructions made explicit reference to the surface colour 
and not to the reflected light perceived intensity; therefore, 
we expected that people involved in the task would show a 
certain embarrassment to make the choice. On the contrary, 
without showing any hesitation, they choose a light grey 
for the lighted wall and a dark grey for the shadowed one. 
Amazed by this result, we asked observers to look again the 
wall and tell us whether they perceived a surface having a 
homogeneous colour or a surface painted with two differ-
ent colours, and which was/were the colour/s.  All of them 
reported to see a homogeneously coloured wall (indicating 
also an almost correct shade), being partly in shadow and 
partly in light. This statement contradicted patently what 
they had done short before, that is to chose from the Munsell 
scale two different greys for the two areas of the wall. “What 
I see is a white wall, half in light and half in shadow”. We 
insisted by asking which colour between that of the lighted 
part and the shadowed one was, according to them, more 
similar to the “true” colour of the surface. Also in this case 
without any hesitation all of them chose the one in light.
These observations then suggest that the parts of the 
same surface that are in light and those in shadow are seen 
as being of the same colour, but they are matched to dif-
ferent colours, and that the colour in light is more “veridi-
cal” than that in shadow. This means that the phenomenal 
experience of a very common experience like the one just 
described shows a complexity that it is difficult to reduce 
entirely in experimental terms.
What observers do when they choose two different greys 
for matching the lighted part and the shadowed one is to 
select greys on the basis of the absolute intensity that comes 
to the eye and not according to the luminance ratio with the 
background, as usually happens when the illumination var-
ies and not the colour. The matching made on the basis of 
the absolute intensity of the light that hits the retina, known 
as luminance match, happens instead when, under homo-
geneous illumination conditions (that is, under conditions 
in which all the parts of an object are exposed to the same 
illumination), the colour of the object must be matched. The 
perceptual result obtained under these conditions has been 
named by Gilchrist type II constancy, to distinguish it from 
type I constancy, which appears when the colour is homoge-
neous and the illumination varies. Ross and Pessoa (see Gil-
christ et al., 1999) renamed this distinction as illumination 
independent constancy (type I constancy) and background 
independent constancy (type II constancy).
Why, then, observers choose two different colours for 
the same surface and immediately after they acknowledge 
that it is not the colour to change but the illumination? Prob-
ably the formulation of the task diverted them. The instruc-
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tions chosen for the experiment should favour a matching in 
the colour dimension and not in that of illumination. Come 
to think of it, however, to give instructions to observers to 
choose from the scale the grey cut from the same surface as 
the target area implies to assume that the illumination lack 
of homogeneity is not considered as an own feature of the 
surfaces. The shadow of a surface is something accidental 
for that surface. But this implication is not at all explicit in 
the instructions used. It is therefore likely that observers cut 
mentally a piece of the surface in light (bringing along also 
the light) and a piece of the surface in shadow (bringing 
along also the shadow) before deciding the grey of the scale 
that matches it. Maybe in this way it is possible to explain 
why a light can be matched to a colour.
Perhaps it is worth adding that the observers under these 
specific circumstances had little option, either they refused 
to make the task or they performed the match. According to 
what it has been reported as regards the higher veridicality 
of the colour in the lighted part of the surface, they might 
have made the match only for the lighted area. But this 
would have pushed them to partly violate the instructions. 
As regards the second question, that is, whether the sur-
face varied in colour or in illumination, the observers an-
swered maintaining that they saw an unevenly illuminated 
homogeneously coloured wall, and they attributed to it a col-
our which was approximately the one corresponding to the 
surface reflective features. It is possible to assume that, in 
this case, the question suggested to the observers to spread 
attention on the whole wall instead on just a part, thing that 
would have permitted them to pick up crucial information 
for the correct attribution of both colour and illumination. 
There is a number of cues that the visual system uses to 
recognize colour changes from illumination ones. For in-
stance, penumbra seems to be a strong cue of change in the 
illumination dimension, even if in this respect there are dif-
ferent views (see Gilchrist, 1988; Soranzo & Agostini, 2004; 
Soranzo & Agostini, 2006; Soranzo, Galmonte & Agostini, 
1999a; Soranzo & Agostini, 2006; Soranzo, Galmonte & 
Agostini, 1999b). But there is a factor that plays a critical 
role in shadow perception, that is, the kind of intersection 
between a reflectance edge and an illumination edge2. The 
intersection where an illumination edge crosses a reflectance 
edge has a property that can be called ratio invariance. It is 
important to underline that this property is not present when 
two illumination edges cross each other. In those cases, the 
ratios at the borders can noticeably change, but there is an-
other kind of regularity, that is, difference invariance.
It seems likely that mathematical regularity at these in-
tersections, which can be observed in natural scenes, guides 
perceptual organization of these scenes, edge classification 
included (Gilchrist, 1988).
To answer to the second question of our experiment, the 
observers had to spread attention, and this made them more 
sensitive to contextual factors and to regularities present in 
the environment.
Another factor that allows to distinguish reflectance 
changes from illumination ones, and that our observers can 
have used to answer to the question about the nature of the 
change, is the amplitude of the luminance ratio along the 
border. Katz (1911) noticed that luminance ratios produced 
by reflectance changes couldn’t exceed the value of 60:1. 
A luminance ratio higher than that value can be produced 
only by a variation in illumination intensity. Koffka (1935) 
integrated Katz’s observation in the organization princi-
ples stated by Wertheimer (1923). Perceptual organization 
principles are a set of laws that control the perceptual units’ 
formation process. The parts that form a stimulus are organ-
ized by following structural relationships in such a way to 
give rise to the percept. Therefore, the percept is not the 
result of a sum or an association of the elements that make 
up the visual scene, but their structured unification on the 
basis of the laws of perceptual organization. For Koffka 
too, the structure of the perceptual field is so that luminance 
ratios exceeding 60:1 represent differences in the apparent 
intensity of the illumination. In the above-mentioned inves-
tigated cases, the luminance ratios were always higher than 
this value.
A point that is still to handle concerns the fact that all the 
participants said that the colour more similar to the “true” 
colour of the surface under observation was the one in light. 
The theoretical implications of this observation are notewor-
thy. In fact, one of the first theories proposed for explaining 
colour perceptual constancy refers to an unconscious infer-
ence mechanism, based on the “known” or “remembered” 
illumination (Helmholtz, 1868/1962). For Helmholtz, con-
stancy derives from an unconscious evaluation, made by the 
visual system, of the illumination intensity, which is then 
used to compensate the actually recorded variations, in such 
a way to keep unchanged objects surface colour. 
Katz (1935), following on from Helmholtz, underlines 
the fact that environment luminosity is something clearly 
visible, and among the various illuminations in which ob-
jects can be seen, only one has the nature of normal illumi-
nation, that of the empty air, in broad daylight, under clear 
sky. “True” colours of things are those that things them-
selves exhibit under this normal illumination.
Helmholtz and Katz’s solutions to colour constancy 
problem are based on the distinction between “low-level” 
processes, that is, peripheral, retinal, physiological proc-
esses, and “high-level” processes, that is, central, cerebral, 
cognitive processes. Perceptual constancy will be due to the 
correction made by central processes on peripheral ones, in 
such a way to obtain a correspondence to “external reality”. 
2 Borders can be distinguished between reflectance edges, that is, an 
inhomogeneity in surface reflectance, and illumination edges, that is, 
an inhomogeneity in surface illumination.
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Therefore, when an object is perceived as subject to a “non-
normal” illumination intensity or colouring, there would be 
a tendency to transform perceived colour in the direction of 
the “true” one, that is, the colour that the object would show 
under “normal” illumination conditions. This reasoning as-
sumes that the observers know which the “true” colour is, 
and that they are able to register the illumination independ-
ently from the object. Given that we have experience with 
objects placed under different illuminations, it can be as-
sumed that their colour is known; therefore, when illumina-
tion is not normal, it is possible to deduct from context the 
true colour of the object through an automatic, and hence 
unconscious, inference, assigning the remainder to illumi-
nation. Such a process would be biologically oriented; to 
allow the individual to move in a world in which familiar 
objects are constant and do not change constantly in appear-
ance (Kanizsa, 1975).
Although they knew nothing about perception, the par-
ticipants in our experiment made the same assumption made 
by Helmholtz and Katz, that is, that the “true” colour is that 
of the objects exposed to a “normal” light, that is, sunlight. 
It would be easy to contradict this assumption by showing 
to our observers the Gelb effect (1929), which consists of 
the demonstration that, if a beam of light illuminates a black 
disk suspended in mid air in a darkened room, the black disk 
is seen as white. Therefore, in this case, assigning the “true” 
colour to the illuminated area would misguide them. 
There is still one last observation to do. In our experi-
ment, observers were immersed in an environment in which 
the mean illumination value was notably high, since almost 
all observations have been made outdoors in sunny days. 
This means that, in general, the impression was that of a 
highly lit environment. It would be interesting to see if the 
more “veridical” colour is always that of the most lit surface 
also under conditions in which observers are put in a pe-
numbra situation, and only a small area of their visual field 
is illuminated by a beam of light coming from, for exam-
ple, an aperture open outside, from which light beams filter. 
In other terms, it would be interesting to see if the quality 
of the predominant illumination is relevant in determining 
which one among the colours of the several surfaces present 
in the scene is perceived as more veridical. It could happen 
that, under penumbra conditions, the true colour would be 
assigned to things in the shadow instead of those in light.
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